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WHY ARE WE DOING THIS? COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND
NONDIRECTIVE SUPERVISION IN CLINICAL TEACHING
By Serge A. Martinez
When, not that long ago, I was a brand new clinic professor attending my
first clinical conference, I heard clinical supervision described this way:
Imagine you have been an excellent professional taxi driver for some time.
Now, imagine you have to get into the back seat and let a beginning taxi driver
take the wheel. You have to get her to take you safely to your destination
without giving her directions. You need to help her understand the rules of the
road and the operation of the vehicle with as little explicit instruction as
possible.
This sounds like a terrible idea for road safety, but any clinical professor
will recognize that the experienced taxi driver in the example is practicing
"nondirective" supervision of the trainee.' At the time I heard this allegory, I
was not told why it was the right way to teach a novice, or what the benefits
(or alternatives) to nondirection were. It was simply explained to me that this
was the way of clinical education, and it did not occur to me until many years
later to ask why this was the best way, or how we arrived at this pedagogical
theory.
Since the earliest days of modern clinical legal education, clinicians have
been looking at the question of how much guidance to give students and how
much responsibility to give students over their own decisions in their cases and
B.A, Brigham Young University; J.D. from Yale Law School. Assistant Professor of Law,
University of New Mexico School of Law. Thank you to my phenomenal research assistants,
Riley Masse and Taylor Smith, and to the faculty of the University of Kansas School of Law, the
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University and University of New Mexico School of
Law who helped me with this article.
1. See DAVID CHAVKIN AND ELLIOT MILSTEIN, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION TEXTBOOK
FOR LAw SCHOOL CLINICAL PROGRAMS (LexisNexis 2001). David Chavkin and Elliott Milstein

have seized on the allegory of the kitchen organizer to convey the same idea: If you are a
Professor of Kitchen Organizing and you are assigned to teach a college student how to organize
a kitchen, what is the best way to teach the student the important skill of kitchen organizing?
Should you model good kitchen organizing? Lecture on principles of kitchen organizing,
followed by an assignment to organize the kitchen? Go to lunch and let the student work without
instruction or guidance? Have a nuanced conversation in which you ask questions to help the
student think about the issues that would be confronted while organizing the kitchen, the relevant
facts of kitchen organizing, etc., then letting the student organize the kitchen, followed by postaction discussion about the student's choices? See also David Chavkin, Am I My Client's
Lawyer?: Role Definition and the ClinicalSupervisor, 51 SMU L. REV. 1507 (1998).
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their clinical learning experience. Clinicians have long since settled on the
default approach of giving clinic students as much responsibility as possible
and intervening as little as possible in their representation of clients, limiting
the amount of explicit guidance. This idea has a powerful hold over clinical
educational theory, and has had it for a very long time. It influences how
students are supervised, how clinics are designed and other aspects of clinical
education. Commitment to nondirective supervision was formerly a sort of
clinical shibboleth, although these days its influence-or, rather, the degree to
which clinicians profess allegiance to it-may be diminishing: recently,
Georgetown
clinical
professor
Wallace
Mlyniec
called
the
directive/nondirective distinction an "anachronism." 2 However, this change
represents not a philosophical shift so much as a practical approach to
supervision that allows for flexibility in the face of various sources of pressure.
Although the distinction may be an anachronism, Professor Mlyniec captures
the current general sentiment of clinicians when he points out that, "[t]his is
not to say that telling a student what to do is the equivalent of engaging a
student in an exploration that leads to new knowledge. . .engaging in an
exploration is properly the 'default' method of supervision"3 for clinic
students. Concessions to practicality notwithstanding, the foundation of
clinical education has not really changed.
Outside of clinical legal education, a lively debate about optimal levels of
guidance for novice learners has been going on for decades, shifting as new
evidence is generated and new information incorporated. Some theorists argue
that educational design should encourage learners to "construct" their own
mental models and learning experience: this is the so-called "constructivist"
school of educational design. Others argue that for novices, discovery and
construction are needlessly mentally taxing and an inefficient use of time and
mental resources, and therefore educational design for new learners should be
focused on efficient learning through telling students the answers to the
problems they are trying to solve: this is often called the "instructionalist"
school of educational design. Although clinicians use "nondirective" and
"directive" in the place of "constructivist" and "instructionalist," respectively,
there is a clear alignment of clinical pedagogy with the constructivist tradition
of advocating for discovery and exploration learning for our novice law
students.
There is as yet no consensus among educational researchers on optimal
amounts of guidance for novices, but the ongoing investigation has provided a
rich source of information that could and should inform pedagogical theory
for clinical education. Clinical legal education obviously leans more toward the
discovery learning and exploration side of the continuum, but it is not clear
that clinical pedagogy is informed by what is going on in modem educational
research and theory.

2. Wallace J. Mlyniec, Where to Begin? Training New Teachers in the Art of Clinical
Pedagogy, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 518 (2012).
3. Id.
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In this article, I examine the idea of nondirective supervision in clinical
education in theory and practice in light of recent findings in educational
research. In Part I, I examine the theory and practice of nondirective
supervision in clinical education. In Part II, I explore the history of
nondirective supervisory pedagogy and how it may have developed in clinical
education. In Part III, I look at the latest evidence and theories from
educational research, where a large body of empirical evidence supports the
value of explicit guidance for novice learners in certain settings. Finally, in
Part IV, I apply this knowledge to clinical pedagogy and urge clinicians to
accept the possibility that directive supervision can be a good thing for our
students, to be more conscious of developments in educational theory and
research than we have been and to generate and then apply our own empirical
evidence to inform our decisions about guidance for clinical students and
assess clinical pedagogy and theory.
I. NONDIRECTION IN CLINICAL EDUCATION

The term "nondirection" is at once vague and misleading. As clinicians
use the term "nondirective," it is a term of art: we know that "all teaching is
directive" to a great extent: in a clinical setting, this means that the instructor
has a set of goals she plans to lead the students to, using a subject matter (area
of law) that has been pre-selected, for a set number of credit hours, and so on.
We are (like that hypothetical taxi driver), trying to get students to arrive at a
particular destination that the student has not chosen. Nondirective supervision
actually relates only to a very small set of instructional elements that arise
directly from students' work on cases.
A. What is Nondirective Supervision?
It is helpful to start with by explaining what I mean by "nondirection." As
most clinicians use it-and as I use it in this essay "nondirection" means
letting the student be responsible for making decisions about the case and
performing lawyering tasks such as interviewing clients, arguing in court and
drafting documents. Rather than telling the student what to do, the
nondirective supervisor, usually through asking probing questions, works to
focus students on important aspects of lawyering. 6 During post-performance
review, the nondirective supervisor asks probing questions to allow the student
to understand key features of the performance without imposing the

4. Mlyniec, supra note 2, at 518.
5. See James Stark et al., Directiveness in Clinical Supervision, 3 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 35,
40-41 (1993). Stark's list also includes sharing information, such as what the law is. In my
experience, this is significantly less relevant to nondirective supervision than making decisions
and performance.
6. See Kimberly E. O'Leary, Evaluating Clinical Law Teaching - Suggestions for Law
Professors Who Have Never Used the Clinical Teaching Method, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 491, 499
(2002) (discussing that it is generally helpful to ask the students to discuss how to plan, rather
than telling the students how to do it).
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supervisor's own views on the student.
Engaging in nondirective supervision usually involves using a questioning
approach to make sure students do not overlook important features of
representation but resisting telling them what to do. The supervisor (1) uses
questions to guide the student to engage in competent and diligent preparation
for the task at hand, such as a court appearance, client meeting, or brief; (2)
allows the student to complete the task, with only the degree of oversight
necessary to ensure the student is meeting ethical standards of competence and
diligence; and (3) asks probing questions to engage the student in a thorough
self-critique after the task is completed.'
Like supervision of planning, supervision of performance is ideally
nondirective. The student and supervisor will very likely moot things like court
appearances, but in the moment of the lawyering, the student is typically put in
a position to perform in role as the lawyer with minimal interference from the
supervisor. A nondirective supervisor tries very hard not to interfere with
performance.' The student does the lawyering unless intervention is warranted.
Nondirection also influences ideas about post-performance feedback.
Teacher and student together reflect on performance, with the supervisor
giving feedback and also focusing on asking the student what she thinks, what
she would do differently, etc. A nondirective approach to feedback encourages
students to find their own assessment of their lawyering through (lightly
guided) reflection.
Asking, not telling, is the key to nondirection. Gently leading students to
discover for themselves what the supervisor hopes they will learn. Of course,
as anyone who has ever been subjected to the Socratic Method will know,
"asking" is not necessarily synonymous with "not leading a student to a
particular answer;" it is quite possible to be directive and leading through the
questioning format.
A question-based nondirective model is the gold standard of prevailing
clinical pedagogy to let students find their own truths about the practice of
law, leading them gently, and only as much as necessary, through well-placed
and thoughtful questions. You can hear the powerful hold of this focus on
leading through questioning in one clinician's confession that "when I get tired
or feel pressure to cover a lot of ground, I sometimes catch myself telling
instead of asking." 9 The prime directive is that you never tell the students what
7. In a classic article, Anne Shalleck provides several fictitious vignettes that demonstrate
this principal. The supervisor guides students by asking questions such as "What do you think?",
"Why are you worried about [the client's] history? Is it important to your theory of the case?" and
"Why is an eviction order important to your client?", among many others. Questions from
students are answered with questions from the supervisor. At no point does the supervisor
actually tell the students what to do. See Ann Shalleck, ClinicalContexts: Theory and Practicein
Law andSupervision, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 117-18 (1993).
8. See Stark supra note 5, at 44. Interestingly, instructors indicate more willingness to
intervene with respect to students' written work than other types of lawyering performance-for
example, conducting client interviews or witness examinations at trial.
9. Justine Dunlap & Peter Joy, Reflection-in-Action: Designing New Clinical Teacher
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to do if it can be avoided.
In contrast, in directive supervision, the supervisor is the one
responsible for the representation, and he is carefully leading the
through the process. This may include explicit instructional methods
modeling the desired performance or giving clear instructions to the
about what to do, and why.

who is
student
such as
student

Rather than have students work to discover their own solutions to
lawyering problems, a supervisor who is acting directively is likely to give the
student the solution. In the planning phase, directive supervision takes the form
of the supervisor making key decisions and spelling out with some precision
what needs to be done and the order in which the steps should be taken to
implement those decisions. Post-performance, directive supervision includes
explicitly pointing out the key features of what the student did, or should have
done, and pointing out the important lessons that should be learned from the
experience. Directive supervision is much more about telling (and showing)
than it is about asking.
B. Support for nondirective supervision
Clinicians have, for the most part, been quite receptive to nondirective
supervision as a theory.'o Although clinicians acknowledge that nondirective
supervision is challenging to implement faithfully," practitioners who, for
whatever reason, are more directive than they believe they should be may even
admit to feelings of guilt.1 2 Anecdotally, I have regularly experienced this
dedication to the ideals of nondirective supervision among clinicians.
Understanding why we clinicians are so attached to nondirection requires
some digging into the benefits that flow from nondirective supervision,
including increased student motivation and enhanced student learning.
Nondirection is not an end in itself; it is a delivery vehicle for student
"ownership" of their cases. Ownership and nondirection are so intertwined in
clinical pedagogy as to be different sides of the same coin. Ownership leads to
increased student motivation: motivation to work hard, to reflect on what has
happened, to try to learn what is necessary to provide quality legal
representation. When the teacher is nondirective, the student is forced to "own"
the problem, which gives them the motivation necessary to make the most of it,
educationally. Nondirective supervision is the manifestation of ideas about
Training by Using Lessons Learnedfrom New Clinicians, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 49, n.132 (2004).
10. See Stark et al., supra note 5, at 42-44. Later surveys confirmed that "the nondirective
adherents dominate" clinical education; see also Dunlap & Joy, supra note 9, at 84-85. The
survey data from 2004 is no longer current, but there is no evidence that clinicians have departed
from the nondirective ideals.
11. Dunlap & Joy, supra note 9, at 63 (survey responses that hardest thing about clinical
education is "being nondirective"). This view is certainly consistent with my own efforts to be a
nondirective clinical supervisor.
12. Id. at n.134 (one survey respondent talked about the challenge of "nondirectiveness
without abdication."). See, e.g., Stark et al., supra note 5. The Stark survey results also show that
most clinicians feel they supervise more directly than they should.
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ownership, motivation, empowerment and reflection. It is a means, not an end
in itself, to get to these important aspects of clinical pedagogy.
The value and power of ownership is not new to clinical education-in
1931 Harvard Law School Dean Tilford E. Dudley praised his law school's
novel clinic by arguing that "hanging around a well-organized office and
working on cases for which someone else has responsibility"'1 3 doesn't work as
a learning tool (at least not for Harvard men). Ownership is still a primary goal
of clinical education. It is hard to overstate the importance clinicians place on
ownership in terms of student learning. Taking ownership is "one of the most
effective learning opportunities for law students," 4 and we know that
"students benefit most from a model in which they can take responsibility for a
matter from beginning to end" 5 and that "student ownership is a critical
element of effective clinical legal education."1 6 This idea has powerful
implications for clinical pedagogy and design. The ideal of the small-case
clinic, in which the student can with relative ease own a case and see it to
completion, is designed to maximize ownership." At least one clinician
appears to have changed his clinic's focus in part out of concerns about
directive supervision interfering with student ownership." The concept is
straightforward: if the case is simple enough that the supervisor can avoid
"taking over" the case by telling the student what to do, then the student is

&

13. TilfordE. Dudley, The HarvardLegal Aid Bureau, 17 A.B.A. J. 692 (1931).
14. Marcy L. Karin & Robin R. Runge, Article: Toward IntegratedLaw Clinics That Train
Social Change Advocates, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 563, 609-10 (2011).
15. David F. Chavkin, Spinning Straw into Gold: Exploring the Legacy of Bellow and
Moulton, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 245, 262 (2003).
16. April Land, "Lawyering Without Leaving Individual Clients Behind, 18 CLINICAL L.
REV. 47, 56 (2011).
17. See Alicia E. Plerhoples & Amanda M. Spratley, Engaging Outside Counsel in
TransactionalLaw Clinics, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 379, 387 (2014) ("[A simple case] approach
enhances the clinician's ability to increase the non-directive nature of their student case
supervision--a lauded principle in clinical legal education--that in turn allows the student to
maximize personal ownership and responsibility over her cases"); see also Jayashri Srikantiah
Jennifer Lee Koh, Individual Representation Alongside Institutional Advocacy: Pedagogical
Implications of A Combined Advocacy Clinic, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 451, 455 (2010) ("Small,
individual cases certainly offer valuable opportunities for student learning by facilitating
ownership and client-centered representation by students."); Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What
They Can Chew: Strategiesfor Involving Students in Problem-Solving Beyond Individual Client
Representation, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 405, 410 (2002) ("It is important to conserve the
components of the small, manageable cases that make them good vehicles for learning: primary
student control, a sense of ownership for the student, and the ability to see a project through from
initiation to completion.").
18. Roy Stuckey, Clinical Professor and Dir. of Clinical Educ. at S.C., Paper delivered at
the 1986 American Association of Law Schools Clinical Teachers' Conference (May 17-22,
1986) (suggested that it factored into his decision to restructure South Carolina's Domestic
Practice Clinic by eliminating contested divorces and handling only uncontested, no-fault
divorces.) ("[n]o fault divorces give me the luxury of allowing students to make mistakes which
are not likely to permanently harm many of their clients."), cited in George Critchlow,
Professional Responsibility, Student Practice, and the Clinical Teacher's Duty to Intervene, 26
GONZ. L. REV. 415, 441 (1991).
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more likely to "own" the case.' 9
The primary benefit of ownership identified in clinical scholarship is
increased student motivation to learn (up to a point) 20. "Motivation greatly
enhances the learning process," 2 ' and ownership is the key to that motivation. 22
This motivation may come from a desire to act competently 23 or from fear and
anxiety, 24 or some combination of these. Regardless of the source of their
motivation, when students have primary responsibility for their cases, they
have no choice but to work hard and learn the things they need to know. They
have a "need to know" 25 that pushes them toward leaming. The flip side of this
is that too little ownership can squelch motivation by stripping students of
ownership of their cases.26 The supervisor may be seen as an "educational
safety net,"27 reducing student motivation. The idea that "direct supervision
does not empower a student" has been described as a clinical "mantra."28
Ownership can also motivate students to examine their own performance
with a critical eye-the "reflection" that is so key to clinical pedagogy. 29 When
students are responsible for their cases, they are required to examine their own
performance to try to extract important lessons for continued representation of
19. But see Brook K. Baker, Learning to Fish, Fishing to Learn: Guided Participationin
the Interpersonal Ecology of Practice, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 68 (1999) (questioning whether
"the goal of maximizing student ownership really requires 'hiding the ball"' via nondirective
supervision).
20. Jennifer P. Lyman, Getting Personal in Supervision: Looking for that Fine Line, 2
CLINICAL L. REV. 211 (1995). ("At the foundation of this teaching, is the assumption that
students learn more when they have more responsibility-right up to the moment responsibility
overwhelms and paralyses them.")
21. Prof Baker describes the possibility of students being overwhelmed by the
responsibility of ownership. See Baker, supra note 19, at 1.
22. Jeanne Charn, Service and Learning: Reflections on Three Decades of the Lawyering
Process at HarvardLaw School, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 75, 91 (2003) ("Students become active
players making real decisions with real consequences. This role assumption creates high
motivation and interest in learning on the student's part."); see also Michael Robinson-Dorn,
Teaching Environmental Law in the Era of Climate Change: A Few Whats, Whys, and Hows, 82
WASH. L. REV. 619, 643 (2007) ("The ownership of a case that comes from representing a real
client with substantial interests at stake provides students with the anchor, context, and
motivation for substantive learning that is unmatched in law school.").
23. Shalleck, supra note 7, at 158 ("[M]ost students care deeply about acting
competently.").
24. Jane Aiken & Stephen Wizner, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics in
EnhancingAccess to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. J. 1997 (2004) (It is "the sense of responsibility that
they feel, the fear, the vulnerability when representing real clients, that inspires students to strive
to be effective lawyers with excellent skills.").
25. Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ.
ST. L. J. 277, 287 (1982).
26. Baker, supra note 19, at 66 n.248 ("[There is a] widespread belief that intervention
interferes with autonomy and role assumption").
27. Baker, supra note 19, at 10.
28. Mlyniec, supra note 2, at 518.
29. Abbe Smith, Carrying on Criminal Court: When Criminal Defense Is Not So Sexy And
Other Grievances, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 723, 728 (1995) (identifying clinician's "mantra" as
"reflection, reflection, reflection."). I take no position on whether Professor Smith or Professor
Mlyniec has identified the actual mantra of clinical education.
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clients.30 In contrast, the ability to reflect can be impeded by too much
instructor direction. 31
Being responsible also enhances the quality of student learning, because
"the more independence the student can assume in representing people, the
better their learning will be" 32 -because they have more ownership. On the
other hand,"[u]nnecessary control of the student's actions inhibits the learning
process."

33

C. Departing from the Nondirective Ideal
There is a difference between talking about something and actually doing
it. Clinicians' ability to faithfully implement nondirection in practice is not
always what we might hope it could be, but it is not because we have stopped
valuing the idea of nondirection. As I noted earlier, Professor Mlyniec has
recently identified a shift in how we talk about directive/nondirective
supervision, calling the distinction an anachronism. 34 Over time, clinicians
have been exploring and becoming more comfortable with situations in which
supervision is directive. However, this more likely reflects a growing
recognition and comfort with the constant tension between pedagogical ideals
and the reality of practice than a philosophical shift within clinical legal
education.
Nondirection may dominate theory and even clinic design, but in real life
it is totally impractical. Surveys and clinical scholarship describe a fairly
regular and universal (if not guilt free) departure from the nondirective default
by clinicians. 35 As Professor Stacy Caplow explains, "[w]hile the received
wisdom among live-client clinicians tends to favor non-directive supervision,
this is one area in which our instructional philosophy may romanticize our
reality." 36 In practice, we as clinicians depart from the ideals more or less
constantly, leading us to self-awareness about and significant efforts to
understand the place for directive supervision. The primary pedagogical
philosophy, however, has not changed.
The most obvious reason for directive supervision-and the one most
30. Anna E. Carpenter, The Project Model of Clinical Education: Eight Principles to
Maximize Student Learning and Social Justice Impact, 20 Clinical L. Rev. 39, 87 (2013) ("When
students have ownership of their clinical work, a goal that can be achieved, in part, by making
students the primary lawyers in their project work, every moment of the clinic experience is a
potential source of reflection, and thus a source of insight and understanding.").
31. Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of
Learning to Learnfrom Experience through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L.
REV. 284, 300 (1981) ("a controlling relationship prevents attainment of the skills needed to learn
from experience.").
32. William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law
Professor:A View from the FirstFloor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 486 (1995).
33. Id. at 487.
34. Mlyniec, supranote 2, at 518.
35. See generally Stark et al., supra note 5.
36. Stacy Caplow, A Year in Practice: The Journalof a Reflective Clinician, 3 CLINICAL L.
REV. 1, 27 (1996).
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commonly cited in clinical scholarship-is to prevent potential harm to clients.
This is a potential hazard inherent to the practice of law by novices whether
the issue is simple or complex, they are still novices engaging in a challenging
practice. They will make mistakes. They will confront problems that they are
simply not able to handle. When a student is unable (or unlikely) to provide
high quality representation, the clinician must choose between letting the
student act independently or intervening to provide a high standard of
representation. It is not a question of if but of when this will come up for a
clinical supervisor.37 Clinicians are very worried about how much risk to
clients can be tolerated before intervention is justified.38
The problem may be the situation, it may be the students, or it may be the
case. Students may not immediately be up to the challenge of taking
responsibility. Every instructor recognizes that there is a dynamic continuum
of student responsibility that is a function of the development of student skill.
Peter Toll Hoffmann suggested a three-phase approach to supervision, moving
from directive to collaborative to nondirective once a student has become
"minimally competent."

39

Complex cases will likely require more directive supervision. If a case is
large and complex, students may not be able to take primary responsibility,
whether due to the difficulty or the simple size of a project.40 Supporters of
complex cases in clinics argue that, even though nondirection is threatened by
large cases, the pedagogical value to students of the large cases outweighs this
liability. 4 1

Simple expediency may also call for directive supervision. When a
deadline is looming or a decision needs to be made in the middle of a hearing
or a deposition, it is not practical to engage in a nondirective exploration of
options and interests.42
It is not that there is no pushback against a philosophy of nondirection: a
small body clinical scholarship has questioned the dominance of nondirection
37. RoY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A
ROADMAP 195 (2007) ("[T]here are times... when the clinical teacher should intervene to protect
clients from harm.").
38. Critchlow, supra note 18, at 428. George Critchlow described it as the question of what
a clinician will do when her "instinct as lawyer is to do one thing and as teacher something
different." Critchlow somewhat confusingly uses "directive" and "nondirective" to describe
clinicians with relative levels of tolerance by supervisors for risk to clients. But see David
Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lavyer?: Role Definition and the Clinical Supervisor, 51 SMU L.
REv. 1507, 1534-1535 (1998) (arguing that failure can be a highly effective teaching tool).
39. Peter Toll Hoffman, The Stages of the ClinicalSupervisory Relationship, 4 ANTIOCH L.
J. 301, 309 (1986).
40. But see, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 30, at 52 (arguing that "[C]linics can engage in
projects that have a meaningful social justice impact while still meeting the pedagogical
objectives of student ownership and role assumption.").
41. See, e.g. Srikantiah & Koh, supra note 17, at 454 (arguing that large institutional
advocacy projects are a good source of clinical education, even though these projects are not a
good fit for non-directive supervision and student ownership of cases).
42. Dunlap & Joy, supra note 9, at 85 (arguing that directive supervision can result from
deadlines).

2016

MARTINEZ: COGNITIVE SCIENCE

in practice. Brook Baker calls it "hiding the ball" and questions its need,
instead arguing for a collaborative supervisory relationship. 3 Harriet Katz,
with some exasperation, invites clinicians to "consider the possibility that
teaching a high standard of practice could best be done by directive means,"44
and strongly argues that experiential learning should be more interested in a
collaborative model of supervision.45 For the most part, however, the "reigning
clinical pedagogy"4 6 of nondirective supervision remains unchallenged.
Every clinician recognizes the need for a diverse array of actual
supervisory methods in practice, rejecting a one-size-fits-all approach in favor
of a nuanced, intuitive fluidity in supervisory approach.47 The title of
Professor Mlyniec's excellent recent article, "Art of Clinical Pedagogy"48 aptly
describes this approach. Most of us have supervisory methods that defy rigid
characterization as directive or nondirective. Every supervisor's approach
liberally combines directive and nondirective elements as informed by the
supervisor's experience.4
However, for as long as our scholarship has addressed the degrees of
directive supervision, the tension it has primarily focused on has been between
the ideology of nondirection and the reality of directiveness in practice. The
scholarship in this area does not reflect any serious disagreement or lack of
certainty about the optimal amount of supervision for novices in the law clinic,
and has not shown any serious inclination to explore the possibility that
directive supervision could provide educational benefits equal to or even
greater than nondirective supervision.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NONDIRECTIVE SUPERVISION THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION

To understand the foundations of nondirection as the current dominant
clinical pedagogy, it is important to understand how we got here. In the
beginning, there was mostly nondirection. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
clinical programs expanded at a phenomenal rate due to a combination of
"student demands for relevance" 0 in their legal training and the availability of

43. Baker, supra note 19, at 68.
44. Harriet Katz, Reconsidering Collaboration and Modeling: Enriching Clinical
Pedagogy, 41 GONz. L. REV. 315, n.74 (2006).
45. See generally id.
46. Srikantiah & Koh, supra note 17, at 471.
47. Minna J. Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M. L.
REV. 185, 188 (1989) (asks "whether any one instructional methodology is best suited to
accomplish" all of the goals of clinic). See also Linda Morton et al., Not Quite Grown Up: The
Difficulty ofApplying an Adult Education Model to Legal Externs, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 469, 47980 (1999).
48. Mlyniec, supranote 2.
49. See Chavkin, supra note 38 at n.68.
50. ROBERT STEVENS, LAw SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO
THE 1980s 216 (1983).
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significant funding to start clinical programs." This sudden expansion
happened without any existing models to guide new clinics, and certainly no
tradition of clinical scholarship or attention to clinical pedagogy. The first
clinics were basically legal aid offices moved into law schools, focused
primarily on maximizing client representation rather than student learning.52
And the first clinical supervisors were recruited from the ranks of practicing
legal aid lawyers.5 3 They were not experienced teachers-they obviously could
not have been-and so they did not have anything but their own experience
learning legal practice to inform their supervision. In this pedagogical vacuum,
they introduced a hands-off approach to supervision that mimicked their own
personal experiences.54
Even as nondirective supervision was being introduced to early clinical
education, one of the first questions that early clinicians asked was how much
responsibility to give law students who are almost always novices-in the
representation of their clinic clients. In other words, they wondered how
directive they should be. The legendary early clinician Gary Bellow very early
on voiced concern that clinicians had "no clear view yet of optimal levels" of
responsibility that students should take on. Professor Bellow had identified
the core question for clinical supervisors, and it was not a given that the answer
would be "embrace nondirection."
At the same time Professor Bellow was wondering about optimal levels of
supervision, some clinicians were looking around them at theories developing
outside of legal education, such as those of psychotherapist Carl Rogers.56
Rogers advocated the creation of "helping relationships."" His focus on
supportive and non-controlling feedback and supervision are an easy fit with
nondirective supervisory relationships in clinical legal education.
The key moment for developing and supporting a theory of nondirective
supervision probably came in 1982, in the form of a seminal article by Frank
Bloch. Professor Bloch noted that clinical education did not, at that time, have
a theoretical justification for its incorporation into American law schools." In
51. H.L. PACKER AND T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 38 (1972).

52.
53.
54.
55.

Kotkin, supra note 47, at 191.
Id.
Id. at 190.

GARY BELLOW, ON TEACHING THE TEACHERS: SOME PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON
CLINICAL EDUCATION AS METHODOLOGY, reprinted in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW

STUDENT 393 (1973).
56. Victor M. Goode, There is a Method(ology) to this Madness: A Review and Analysis of
Feedback in the Clinical Process, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 223, 234 (2000) ("Like other service
professions, the early legal clinics owed a great deal to the theoretical approach of Carl Rogers.").
See David R Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and
Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 104-107 (1979). See also Michael Meltsner & Philip
Schrag, Scenesfrom a Clinic, 127 PENN L. REV. 1 (1978).
57. See CARL ROGERS,
PSYCHOTHERAPY (1961).
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58. Frank S. Bloch, The AndragogicalBasis of ClinicalLegal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV.
321, 336, 336 n.13 (1982). He also notes that perhaps this not so bad traditional legal education
also lacks any theoretical justification.
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response to this gap, he introduced clinicians to the "andragogy" model of
educational design for adult learners. The most prominent advocate of
andragogy was Malcolm Knowles, an educational theorist and educator
working in the field of adult education.59
Knowles argued that adult education design had to be mindful of a series
of assumptions about the factors affecting motivation for learning in adult
learners:
1.

Adults are self-directed learners who should be involved in the
planning and evaluation of their instruction.60

2.

Experience should provide the basis for learning activities.61

3.

Adults are most ready to learn subjects that have immediate
relevance and impact to their job or personal life.62

4.

Adult learning is problem-centered rather than content-oriented.63

Knowles argued that adult learning should ideally be self-directed,
experiential, and motivated by the applicability of the learning to the learner's
immediate need. According to Knowles, "the more active the learner's role in
the process, the more he is probably leaming. "64 Andragogy is fundamentally
about managing learner input into the educational process to optimize
motivation and, in theory, maximize learning.
Professor Bloch applied the principles of andragogy to clinical education
and concluded that clinical education works because it is "andragogically
sound." 65 As applied to clinical supervision, Professor Bloch concluded that
andragogy discourages directiveness. 66 Supervisors should encourage students
to decide for themselves when to ask for help from a supervisor and when to
engage in exploration on their own. 67 Bloch concluded that the most effective
version of supervision was one that fostered mutual inquiry and shared
responsibility. 68 Interestingly, and somewhat ironically in light of clinicians'
general interpretation of his article, Bloch argued not for nondirective
supervision but rather for a collaborative approach, where the students and
teachers work together as colleagues.
Influenced by their interpretation of Bloch's article, "many clinicians.

59. MALCOLM S. KNOWLES, THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ADULT EDUCATION (Follett
Publishing Company ed., 1980). Knowles' book made a big splash in many educational quarters,
but it does not appear to have been until 1982 that clinicians took note of his ideas.
60. Id. at 45-49.
61. Id. at 49-51.
62. Id. at 51-53.
63. Id. at 53-58.
64. Id. at 50.
65. Bloch, supra note 58, at 353.
66. Id. at 349.
67. Id. at 349-50.
68. Id. at 338. Accord Chavkin, supra note 38, at 1530-31 (suggesting that "apparent
inconsistency" was to some degree a reflection of "the tension between service responsibilities
and educational goals.").
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.believed that, in order to implement Knowles' theory of adult learning in the
clinical context, their supervisory role required them to be 'nondirective."' 69
It's not hard to see why the clinical world found much to like in andragogical
principles that supported minimal intervention from supervisors. Bloch's
article helped legitimize clinical education generally by providing a
theoretical underpinning-and validated nondirective supervision specifically.
In response, clinicians embraced andragogical principles as a justification for
prevailing clinical teaching methodologies.70 Clinicians as a body were even
more willing to accept andragogy than educational theorists," possibly due to
the close fit between andragogy and clinical goals and theory.72
Although few clinicians today explicitly refer to andragogy, the
andragogical principles of maximizing motivation, reflection and
empowerment have become the primary focus of clinical pedagogy. Building
from Bloch's seminal work on andragogy and clinical education, clinicians
have developed a robust and nuanced theory of ownership and its benefits in
terms of motivation of students that goes hand in hand with nondirective
supervision.
The way that clinical education arrived at its current state of nondirective
methodology is not necessarily problematic-the lack of continued exploration
and searching for guidance to inform supervisory theory would be excusable if
we were sure that we were engaged in best practices. In fact, however, we do
not have any such assurances. In a 1998 article, David Chavkin noted that
clinicians had "no answers from empirical research" relating to "the extent to
which most [clinic] students learn better from having to work their way
initially through a problem without step-by-step guidance."73
It is not that we have no evidence to support prevailing clinical
pedagogy we have decades of observations from the field to support
dominant practices. But, long after Professor Chavkin's observation, we still
only have limited evidence to help us evaluate the effectiveness of our
pedagogy. Even if we accept that nondirection is key to student motivation,74
we do not have empirical evidence to support claims that nondirective
supervision enhances student learning compared to directive supervision.

69. Morton et al., supra note 47, at 480.
70. Id. at 469.
71. Id. at 478.
72. See id. See also Kotkin, supra note 47, at 192.
73. Chavkin, supra note 38, at 1529.
74. See J.D. Fletcher, From Behaviorism to Constructivism: A PhilosophicalJourneyfrom
Drill and Practice to Situated Learning, in SIGMUND TOBIAS & THOMAS M. DUFFY,
CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTRUCTION: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 246 (2011). This question is beyond the
scope of this essay, but the assertion seems somewhat questionable. There is evidence that what
some derisively call "drill and kill" education can actually be enjoyable for students. As for law
students in particular, we have plenty of evidence that law students are quite motivated to learn
and perform in many educational settings that are highly directive and give students no
ownership, such as in most of their law school classes.
75. In fact, we tend to forget to ask ourselves whether students are actually learning and
how we might know it. Although we have spent a great deal of time thinking about how
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Even in the absence of strong evidence, there is general agreement among
clinicians that the question of whether supervision should be directive or
nondirective is one that has long since been settled. Outside of clinical legal
education, however, there is an ongoing and occasionally contentious debate
about optimal levels of guidance for novices-it is certainly not settled. It is
not even close to being settled. It has produced a large body of evidence,
theory and scholarship. Clinicians should be aware of this ongoing
conversation and its implications for clinical legal education. In the next
section, I discuss the current state of science and theory of educational design
for novices.
III. EDUCATIONAL THEORIES OF OPTIMAL GUIDANCE FOR NOVICE
LEARNERS

The concepts that those of us in clinical legal education call nondirective
and directive supervisory methods are (broadly) similar to what educational
researchers call, respectively, "constructivist" and "instructionalist" theories of
educational design. Like our theory of nondirective clinical supervision,
constructivist theories emphasize self-directed learning and exploration.
Instructionalist theories, in contrast, favor explicit guidance for novice
learners, similar to what clinicians would call a directive theory of supervision.
These comparisons are not an exact fit, and educational researchers use their
own language, so in an effort to avoid confusion when speaking of research
and theory outside of the world of clinical legal education, I will use the
terminology of educational research.
A. Constructivist Theories ofEducational Design
Clinical pedagogy's orientation toward student discovery and exploration
to find their own answers parallels, without explicitly incorporating, a long line
of pedagogical theory that favors discovery, exploration and construction of
knowledge by the learner. The many variations on this idea are loosely
grouped together under the umbrella term "constructivist." 76
Drawing on inspiration from enlightenment philosophers and more recent
scholars like Jerome Bruner, theorists have argued that, since learning is done
by constructing knowledge, learning will be better and deeper," and more
naturally effective, when learners "discover" their own knowledge by
constructing their own solutions to problems. Active involvement by learners
will increase their ability to develop and apply conceptual knowledge."
motivation and ownership of the taxi driving experience, we have devoted significantly less
energy to investigating whether we've reached the destination.
76. Other terms used to describe this approach include exploration, discovery, and problembased learning.
77. See Sofie M. M. Loyens & David Gijbels, Understandingthe Effects of Constructivist
Learning Environments: Introducing a Multi-DirectionalApproach, 36 INSTRUCTIONAL SC.: AN
INT'L J. OF THE LEARNING Sci. 351, 352 (2008).

78. See Sofie M. M. Loyens et al., Students' Conceptions of Distinct Constructivism
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Proponents of educational design that relies on discovery and construction, like
clinical scholars, argue that this approach also provides more motivation than
direct guidance.
In its purest form, this would mean giving students no direction at all, but
that approach, if it was ever embraced, has been abandoned.7 9 Instead, current
theory suggests that the teacher's job is not to provide explicit procedures for a
learner to follow but rather to challenge the learner's thinking. 0
The key to learning through discovery and exploration is that it builds
deeper learning through helping the learner "construct their own personal
learning experience"" because "learning is best understood, stored and applied
when learners develop their own mental models." 82 With this in mind, the idea
is to give learners the support necessary for them to construct those mental
models.8 3 This is done by making learners discover their own solutions to
novel (but still realistically solvable) problems, delaying guidance as long as
possible. In application, this means that guidance and information are
strategically withheld from learners, including novices, to allow them to learn
for themselves without being given the answers. While immediate feedback
may result in more efficient learning in the short term, delayed feedback is
more appropriate when the goal is long-term retention and transfer. 84
The arguments for constructivist educational design for novices are
similar to those that we use to support nondirective clinical supervision. And,

Assumptions 22 J. OF PSYCHOL. AND EDUC. 179, 179 (2007). See also Cindy E. Hmelo-Silver et
al., Scaffolding and Achievement in Problem-Based and Inquiry Learning: A Response to
KirchnerSweller, and Clark, 42 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 99, 102-04 (2007).
79. Richard Mayer, Should There be a Three-Strikes Rule Against Pure Discovery

Learning?, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 14, 17 (2004).
80. John R. Savery & Thomas M. Duffy, Problem Based Learning: An InstructionalModel
and Its Constructivist Framework, 35 EDUC. TECH. 35 (2001). One of the most prominent
applications of a discovery-based theory of educational design has been the adoption by several
medical schools in the US and Canada of Problem-Based Learning, or PBL. Working together in
a small group with the support of a tutor, students in a problem-based learning environment work
together to discover solutions to new problems. Several studies have compared PBL with
traditional instruction, with interesting conclusions. A recent meta-analysis of several studies
concluded that there was "strong evidence" that problem-based learning is superior to traditional
education methods for several important areas of medical education. However, problem-based
learning graduates appear to self-assess as having less medical knowledge than peers who
received traditional medical education. See Gerald Choon-Huat Koh et al., The Effects of
Problem-Based Learning During Medical School Competence: A Systemic Review, 178
CANADIAN MED. Ass'N. J. 34 (2008).
81. Jennifer Vogel-Walcutt et al., Cognitive Load Theory vs. Constructivist Approaches:
Which Best Leads to Efficient, Deep Learning? 27 J. OF COMPUTER ASSISTED LEARNING 133,

135 (2011).
82. Id.
83. Id. See Alexander Renkl & Robert K. Atkinson, Interactive Learning Environments:
Contemporary Issues and Trends. An Introduction to the Special Issue, EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV.

235, 236 (2007).
84. See Alyssa Friend Wise & Kevin O'Neill, Beyond More Versus Less: A Reframing of
the Debate on InstructionalGuidance, in CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTRUCTION: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

92 (Sigmund Tobias & Thomas M. Duffy eds., 2009).
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like clinical legal educational theories, exploration and discovery theories
suffer from a paucity of actual empirical evidence to support them. The
construction-based theories are, as one proponent of constructivism has
described it, "stimulating rhetoric" but lacking in empirical support."
B. Instructionalist Theories ofEducational Design
Researchers have generated a significant body of experimental evidence
that supports the argument that for novices, learning is maximized by explicit
instruction that limits the amount of time and effort expended searching for
solutions to problems. This is broadly called the "instructionalist" 86 argument.
In application, it is similar to what we clinicians would call directive.
The supporters of instructionalist educational design have recently relied
on developments in our understanding of the way that humans process and
store new knowledge (scholars call this "cognitive architecture") to explain the
evidence that novices can benefit more, and more quickly, from directive
supervision. Learners can use their time and cognitive energy more efficiently,
and, because this type of instruction is informed by cognitive architecture, it
can lead to better retention and transfer."
In a seminal study published in 1985," John Sweller and Graham Cooper
described a series of experiments in which they compared the results on future
performance of students solving algebra problems using "worked examples"explicit, step-by-step demonstrations of how to solve the problemsthat
effectively give students the solution and the problem simultaneously-and
students using conventional problem solving techniques.89 Students who used
worked examples not only spent less time learning the material initially, in
subsequent testing they performed better than their problem-solving peers on

85. Tobias Sigmund, An Eclectic Appraisal of the Success or Failure of Constructivist
&

Instruction, in CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTRUCTION: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 346 (Sigmund Tobias

Thomas M. Duffy eds., 2009).
86. This theory has also been described as the objectivist or the transmission theory. The
terms "constructivist" and "instructionalist" are imperfect and I use them somewhat reluctantly.
They are hardly the polar opposites that the terminology might suggest, and every theory and
theorist exists along a spectrum depending on the amount, type and timing of guidance they
recommend. In this essay, I use the terms to convey general placement along the continuum
without intending to definitively place any particular theory in any particular camp.
87. Paul A. Kirschner et al., Why Minimal GuidanceDuring InstructionDoes Not Work: An
Analysis of the Failure of Constructivist, Discovery, Problem-Based, Experiential, and InquiryBased Testing, 41 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 75, 79-80 (2006). Professor John Sweller, the most
prominent supporter of instructionalism, has recently introduced an evolutionary component to
this argument, suggesting that certain things like a native language and social interactions are so
hard-wired into our brains that we learn them in a different way than, for example, physics or
math. See John Sweller, What Human Cognitive Architecture Tells Us About Constructivism, in
CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTRUCTION: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 127, 129 (Sigmund Tobias & Thomas M.

Duffy eds., 2009).
88. John Sweller & Graham A. Cooper, The Use of Worked Examples as a Substitute for
Problem Solving in LearningAlgebra, 2 COGNITION AND INSTRUCTION 59, 59 (1985).
89. Id.
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problems similar to the sample problems.90
Cognitive researchers call the effect described by Sweller and Cooper the
"worked example effect." 9' In the past 30 years, the worked example effect has
been identified in a variety of domains, including mathematics, database usage,
meteorology, 92 electrical safety, 93 understanding lightning94 and nautical
knotting, 95 among others. In study after study, the more explicit the instruction,
the better novice learners performed on subsequent challenges.
One interesting finding from the research related to the worked example
effect has been an understanding that the value of explicit guidance diminishes
gradually as learners gain expertise. In fact, at some point, explicit guidance
actually hinders learning-it's worse than no guidance at all.96 Researchers call
this the "expertise reversal effect"-expert learners are better off without
explicit guidance. 97
C Cognitive Load Theory
To explain the worked example effect and the expertise reversal effect,
theorists have developed "cognitive load theory," or CLT, which argues that
instructional efficiency is maximized by attending to the features of cognitive
architecture.
Cognitive load theory starts from findings about working memory and our
ability to process novel information to explain how we learn "complex
cognitive tasks, where learners are often overwhelmed by the number of
information elements and their interactions that need to be processed
simultaneously before meaningful learning can commence."98 In other words,
how do we begin to learn complicated things (like the practice of law)?
Cognitive scientists talk about two different types of memory: "working
memory" and "long-term memory." Working memory is the "place" where we
process new information. We have long known that most people can only keep
7+/-2 pieces of information in working memory at any given time. 99 When we
90. Id.
91. Sweller & Cooper, supra note 88.
92. Pierter Wouters, et al., How to Optimize Learningfrom Animated Models: A Review of
GuidelinesBased on Cognitive Load, 78 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 645, 656 (2010).
93. F. Pollock et al., Assimilating Complex Information, 12 LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION
61, 67 (2002).
94. Richard F. Mayer & Paul Chandler, When Learning is Just a Click Away: Does Simple
User Interaction Foster Deeper Understanding of Multimedia Messages, 93 J. OF EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 390 (2001).
95. Stephan Schwann & Roland Riempp, The Cognitive Benefits ofInteractive Videogames:
Learning to Tie Nautical Knots, 14 LEARNING AND INSTRUCTIONS 293 (2004).
96. See Slava Kalyuga et al., The Expertise Reversal Effect, 8 COGNITION AND
INSTRUCTION 23, 25 (2003).
97. Id. at 23.
98. Fred Paas et al., Cognitive Load Theory: InstructionalImplications of the Interaction
Between Information Structures and Cognitive Architecture, 32 INSTRUCTIONAL SCI. 1, 1 (2004).
99. George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our
Capacityfor ProcessingInformation, 63 PSYCHOL. REv. 81, 90-93 (1956).
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are processing new information, it may be as low as 2-3 pieces of
information.' 00 Long-term memory, on the other hand, is an effectively
limitless storage space for information. As new information is processed, it is
integrated with related existing long-term memories to create "chunks" of
information.' 0 ' Cognitive scientists use the term "schema" to describe these
chunks of information held in long-term memory.1 02 Long-term memory in the
form of relevant schemas "can be held and processed in working memory
effortlessly" when needed.1 03
Although working memory has serious limitations when dealing with
novel information, it is quite capable of handling large amounts of complex
information drawn from long-term memory. As learners acquire more
information and experience, their increasingly comprehensive schemas allow
them to process problems more quickly and efficiently, and eventually,
automatically. In the schema-based model, most learning is, like expertise,
domain-specific-expert lawyers are good at making legal arguments because
their mental models incorporate the laws and precedents that give context to
those arguments.1 04 Novice lawyers, however, do not have the mental models
necessary to process and apply complex legal reasoning to complex legal
problems. With this expert/novice distinction in mind, educational design for
novices should seek to change long term memory through the development of
domain-specific appropriate schemas.
Cognitive load theory explains the impact of the "load"-the amount of
mental work required on learning.' According to CLT, a cognitive load that
is too high means that some of the information will simply not be processed

&

100. Fred Paas et al., supra note 98, at 2.
101. Vogel-Walcutt et al., supra note 81, at 134.
102. For a fuller discussion of schema theory as applied to legal education, see Stefan H.
Krieger & Serge A. Martinez, A Tale of Election Day 2008: Teaching Storytelling Through
Repeated Experiences, 16 LEGAL WRITING 117, 127 (2010). See also Stefan H. Krieger & Serge
A. Martinez, Performance Isn't Everything: The Importance of Conceptual Competence in
Outcome Assessment ofExperiential Learning, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 251, 267 (2012).
103. John Sweller et al., Cognitive Architecture and Instructional Design, 10 EDUC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 251, 256 (1998).
104. Sweller, supra note 87, at 131.
105. Researchers have identified three different types of cognitive load: intrinsic,
extraneous, and germane. Intrinsic load is a function of the material to be learned and the
learner's existing knowledge. It can be managed through "scaffolding" or other forms of
instructional support. See Kalyuga et al., supra note 97. See, e.g., Jeroen J. G. van Merrienboer
John Sweller, Cognitive Load Theory and Complex Learning: Recent Developments and Future
Directions, 17 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 147 (2005). See also, e.g., Slava Kalyuga, Expertise
Reversal Effect and Its Implicationsfor Learner-TailoredInstruction, 19 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV.
509 (2007). Extraneous load is the additional effort required to understand the material resulting
from unnecessary information that requires a learner's attention this can be increased or
decreased depending on the quality of instructional design. Ideally, this will be as low as possible.
Germane load is "good" load it is the cognitive load that is devoted to schema development,
independent of the material itself. See Paas et al., supra note 99. In a perfect educational design,
extraneous load would be minimized, germane load would be maximized, and intrinsic load
would be optimized to the "Goldilocks" level that allows for maximum student learning without
exceeding the inherent limit on cognitive load of the learner.
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it will effectively be lost to the learner. A load that is too low can also lead to
degraded performance,1

06

Cognitive load theory argues that learning is most effective when the
cognitive load is optimized for efficiency. Without explicit guidance, the
novice can only engage in "search" techniques-a usually ineffective hit-ormiss approach to trying to discover the solution to a problem.' 07 For these
learners, cognitive load can be limited through varying levels of guidance. For
a more experienced learner, guidance need not be so robust because they have
already developed some schemas. And for an expert who has already
developed mental models allowing her to respond to a particular type of
problem, adding guidance may actually hinder learning by increasing
extraneous cognitive load through superfluous instructional features that must
be attended to. Optimal cognitive load is not a static concept-it must be
constantly tweaked to remain maximized even as a learner becomes more
sophisticated.
Cognitive load theory suggests that as a learner progresses, guidance
should be gradually faded and the learner given more opportunity to engage in
active problem solving. Once a learner has become an expert, guidance should
be withdrawn altogether and the learner should be engaged solely in
constructing her own solutions to problems.' 0 s
The implications for instructional design of the limits on the ability of
working memory to process novel information are straightforward: novices,
who are likely to be overloaded by too much or overly complex new
information, "should not be presented with material in a manner that
unnecessarily requires them to search for a solution with its attendant heavy
working memory load rather than being presented with a solution."1 09 Novice
learners should simply be taught the procedures of a domain by taking a
complex concept and breaking it down into smaller, manageable chunks to
limit complexity, which are then taught very explicitly. Once students are
familiar with the individual "chunks," the relationship of the parts to the whole
can be explored. Working memory load must be carefully managed to enhance
learning." 0 If too much information is presented at once, information may be
lost.
Cognitive load theory explains why experts and novices actually learn in
106. Fred Paas et al., supra note 98, at 1.
107. See Sweller & Cooper, supra note 88 at 60.
108. This progression is similar to Peter Toll Hoffman's "stages" proposal that clinical
supervision should begin with explicit guidance that is gradually faded out as student competence
increases. See Hoffman, supra note 39, at 304. However, the point at which CLT suggests
guidance should be withdrawn is well past the point of the "minimally competent" student in
Hoffman's model.
109. John Sweller et al., Why Minimally Guided Teaching Techniques Do Not Work: A
Reply to Commentaries, 42 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 115, 116 (2007). This idea reflects Gary
Bellow's justification for nondirection arguing that students are actually less able to perform well
after lawyering tasks "have been dissected in the classroom," because they simply have too many
things to think about to allow them to actually perform well. See also Bellow, supra note 56.
110. Kirschner et al., supra note 87, at 77. See also Sweller et al., supra note 109, at 116.

MARTINEZ: COGNITIVE SCIENCE

2016

43

different ways. Novices need much more guidance, but that same guidance can
actually hinder learning for experts. In most cases, however, withholding
knowledge from a learner does not lead to increased knowledge
development."'
D. Explicit Instruction and Ill-Structured Domains
So far, so good the worked example effect has been seen and welldocumented in a variety of domains. It undeniably exists in certain settings and
should be taken seriously as a tool for educational design. The question for us
as clinicians is whether it applies to clinical legal education. Unfortunately, the
answer is not particularly clear.
The vast majority of the evidence for the worked example effect and other
types of explicit guidance has come from "well structured" domains, such as
mathematics and physics,11 2 that tend toward a structure in which there is a
"right" answer and a standard path to finding a solution. It is possible,
therefore, that the worked example effect is not applicable to novice learning in
domains that are what educational scientists call "ill-structured." An illstructured domain is "characterized by being indeterminate, inexact,
noncodifiable, nonalgorithmic, nonroutinizable, imperfectly predictable,
nondecomposable into additive elements, and, in various ways, disorderly."113
The line between domains that are well-structured or ill-structured is itself hard
to define, but certainly the practice of law is at the less-structured end of the
spectrum.
In ill-structured domains, explicit instruction is challenging because, by
definition, there are no rules/procedures to teach that's what makes these
domains ill-structured. (On the other hand, if there are no rules and experts are
unable to agree on how to solve a particular problem, it may not be reasonable
to expect novices to discover workable solutions." 4 ) There is also some
evidence that the simplification of complex processes that is necessary in
instructionalism can lead to "maladaptive reductionism."" 5 This "artificial
neatening" may seduce learners (and perhaps instructors) into thinking that the
rules really function as rules when in a real-world setting they almost never
do.11 6 Unfortunately, there is still not much empirical evidence to help us

111. See Richard E. Clark et al., PuttingStudents on the Path, 36 AM. EDUC. 6, 7-8 (2011).
112. Rand Spiro & Michael Deschryver, Constructivism: When it's the Wrong Idea and
When it's the Only Idea, in What Human Cognitive Architecture Tells Us About Constructivism,
in CONSTRUCTIVIST INSTRUCTION: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 106, 113 (Sigmund Tobias & Thomas

M. Duffy eds., 2009).
113. Id. at 106-07. The classic example of the "ill-structured" problem is the thought
experiment proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein: defining a "game." LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1953).

114. Richard E. Clark, How Much and What Type of Guidance is Optimal for Learning

from Instruction?, in CONSTRUCTIVIST

INSTRUCTION: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 168, 176 (Sigmund

Tobias & Thomas M. Duffy eds., 2009).
115. Spiro & Deschryver, supra note 112, at 110.

116. Id. at 111.
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understand when a domain might be theoretically too ill-structured to support
the worked example effect.
Recent research has, however, generated evidence from a few less-wellstructured domains. In one study, learners were asked to identify the styles of
several designers after instruction either through problem solving or a worked
example. The learners who received the worked examples performed better
than those taught through problem solving methods." 7 In another study in the
field of medicine, researchers found that learners' diagnostic competence was
increased after exposure to "elaborated feedback"-a kind of post-performance
worked example." 8 In 2013, researchers identified the worked-example effect
in the ill-structured domain of English literature. University students identified
as "less knowledgeable" who learned through worked examples performed
better on a retention test than those who learned through problem solving."19
At least one study has looked for the worked example effect in the domain
of learning law. In a recent experiment, Dutch law students were asked to solve
legal analysis problems using a civil code.1 20 Students from the first year and
students from the third year (in the Netherlands, law is an undergraduate field
of study) were asked to solve a legal reasoning problem. Some received
worked examples as guidance, and some received less guidance. For both sets
of students, first years and third years, the worked example cohorts
demonstrated better learning than those from the other cohort.121
It is possible that these results merely reflect learning of highly-structured
elements of ill-structured domains. For example, the study of Dutch law
students measured the relatively structured and straightforward task of
applying the civil code to a discrete set of facts-it does not come close to
approximating the complexities of helping a client make and implement a
decision in an actual case. However, the multiple studies finding the worked
example effect in ill-structured domains should inspire further inquiry before
we can conclude that explicit guidance is not appropriate for ill-structured
domains.

117. Arianne Rourke & John Sweller, The Worked-Example Effect Using Ill-Defined
Problems: Learning to Recognise Designers' Styles, 19 LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION 185, 185
(2009).
118. Robin Stark et al., Case-basedLearning with Worked Examples in Complex Domains:
Two Experimental Studies in Undergraduate Medical Education, 21 LEARNING AND
INSTRUCTION 22 (2011).
119. Suna Kyun et al., The Effect of Worked Examples When Learning to Write Essays in
English, 81 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 385 (2013).
120. Fleurie Nievelstein et al., The Worked Example and Expertise Reversal Effect in Less
Structured Tasks: Learning to Reason about Legal Cases, 38 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 118
(2013).
121. Id. at 118. The Dutch study did not find any expertise reversal among 3rd year law
students, suggesting that either it does not exist in legal studies or, more likely, even after 2 years
of intensive study, novices have not reached a particularly high level of ability to engage in legal
analysis.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION

In the absence of consensus about the relative directiveness of guidance
for novice learners across domains, what should clinicians do? Unfortunately,
the existing evidence raises a whole new set of questions for us about when
and how to give guidance to our novice law students. While it casts some
doubt on the long-standing orthodoxy of nondirective supervision, it does not
either confirm or refute any particular approach to supervision. However,
looking at research and theory from the science of human learning gives us at
least three suggestions going forward.
First, we should be more open to the possibility that directive supervision
is acceptable not only for practical reasons but for philosophical ones-it may
help our students, novice learners for the most part, learn more effectively.
There is a very large body of experimental evidence supporting explicit
guidance for novice learners, and it makes no sense for us to ignore it or
discount it. Minna Kotkin's suggestion that we should rely more on
"modeling" requires less defense if we understand the role of worked examples
and understand that modeling is simply an in-person worked example that
"makes the expertise trajectory clear by showing what the end goal of
'expertise' looks like."1 22 There may be good reasons to deviate from
nondirection that are not based in practicalities such as time or client pressures.
Directive supervision may or may not be the best approach, but we certainly do
not have enough evidence to support the traditional hostility to it from the
clinical world.
Some legal scholars have already embraced cognitive learning theory and
its implications for activating prior knowledge in law students 23 and for legal
writing.1 24 In light of some of the questions that remain about the applicability
of cognitive load theory across domains, I worry that this may be premature,
but it demonstrates an admirable willingness to look beyond clinical and legal
educational scholarship for guidance. No doubt, more attention to
developments in cognitive psychology and its findings would benefit clinicians
and clinical law students.
Second, we should be more aware of what is happening outside our
discipline. This may say as much about me as about clinical education
generally, but I had been teaching clinic for several years before I heard
anything about the educational research happening outside our walls. Although
there has been a hot and occasionally contentious debate happening for

122. Quincy Elvira et al., Designing Education for Professional Expertise Development,
SCANDINAVIAN J. OF EDuc. RES. 1470 (2016).

123. Shaun Archer et al., Reaching Backward and Stretching Forward: Teaching for
Transfer in Law School Clinics, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 258 (2014) (applying cognitive load theories
of activating prior knowledge for more effective learning).
124. Terill Pollman, The Sincerest Form of Flattery:Examples and Model-Based Learning
in the Classroom, 64 J. LEGAL EDuC. 298 (2014) (applying cognitive load theories of guidance to
legal writing).
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decades, there is almost no mention of it in the clinical education literature.1 25
Early clinicians incorporated theories of Carl Rogers and Malcolm Knowles
into the inchoate clinical pedagogy, but in the decades since Professor Bloch
introduced us to andragogy, we have in many ways remained isolated from
ongoing research into educational design for novices. Thirty years is an
eternity in the life of educational theory and research. The literature and
evidence on optimal levels of guidance for novices is vast and full of
contradictions, but it obviously has significant potential benefit for clinical
legal education.
Third, we need more information. Somewhat ironically, clinical legal
education has adopted an approach that reveals our bias towards the discovery
theory of learning: instead of looking to educational experts for guidance, we
have spent the past 50 years trying to discover through our own explorations
the optimal amount of guidance for our novice students.
To better understand the efficacy of our teaching, we should do some
research. It is frankly astonishing how far behind some of our peers we arefor example, medical educators are constantly doing research on their own
efficacy. As a result, medical educators have a robust theoretical and empirical
body of knowledge to draw on in refining medical education. That is
changing-outside of the clinical world, legal education has recently begun to
tentatively embrace empirical research.1 26 Those of us in clinical legal
education, however, have done almost no research to assess our success or
failure.1 27

To accurately understand the role of guidance in clinical education, we
need to generate, interpret and apply empirical evidence. To generate the type
of evidence necessary to guide clinical education, we must conduct our own
experiments. Of course, one reason that we have not developed a body of
empirical evidence is that it is hard. Methods for assessing legal performance
are challenging, but not necessarily impossible. Borrowing from medical
education, my co-author Professor Stefan Krieger and I recently suggested
using a "think-aloud" protocol.1 28 In this type of assessment, students are asked
to speak their thoughts aloud as they think through a problem they have been
given, and the evaluator listens not only for an end result but also for evidence
of the understanding and application of key concepts by the learner. Of course
125. I have only found one reference, in Chavkin, supra note 38, at 1531.
126. See David Herring & Collin Lynch, Teaching Skills of Legal Analysis: Does the
Emperor Have Any Clothes? 18 LEGAL WRITING 85 (2012) (reporting the results of a study of
impact of case-dialogue teaching on students' legal reading and reasoning). See, e.g., Stefan H.
Krieger, The Development of Legal Reasoning Skills in Law Students: An Empirical Study, 56 J.
LEGAL EDuc. 332, 336 (2006).
127. I am only aware of a few small empirical studies. See Stefan H. Krieger, The Effect of
ClinicalEducation on Law Student Reasoning: An Empirical Study, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
359 (2008); see also Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REV.
57 (2009).
128. See Krieger & Martinez, supra note 102. This idea did not originate with us we
borrowed it from the medical school assessment literature. Medical schools really are quite far
ahead of legal education in this respect.
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there are other methods. Surely clinicians can develop an empirical protocol
that works for clinical legal education.
Even then, the way forward may not be clear. As impressive and useful as
it would be to generate a body of knowledge about what kinds of guidance lead
to best learning outcomes, the matter would still be far from resolved. It is not
a straight line from effectiveness of a particular teaching method to
implementation in clinical settings. Instead, it becomes another variable to
incorporate into the complex calculus of motivation, efficiency, client
protection, long-term effects and other factors. To get the math anywhere close
to right, we need to have the right information to plug into our equations. This
may sound an awful lot like "well, it's an art." Perhaps clinical legal education
is an art but the more informed we are about what we are doing, the better
the final artwork is likely to be.
V. CONCLUSION

Learning can happen in many ways, including through highly directive
and nondirective means. Once someone has reached mastery, whether through
directive or nondirective means, the path that they took is probably not
important. The problem, from a clinician's standpoint, is that we only have
students for a very limited time and they are usually very close to entering their
professional lives, in which they may or may not receive additional guidance
and mentoring. If we only have one semester to do this, what is the
instructional design that maximizes student development from their position as
novice lawyers toward the expert practitioners we hope they will be during that
time?
Nondirective supervision is almost always wildly inefficient for students
who are trying to discover the "right" answers about what to do or how to do it,
and for clients who are often left waiting while students and supervisors go
about their work nondirectively. To justify this approach, we should have a
pretty good reason for doing so. Instead, we have a long tradition that has not
been subjected to significant critique from a theoretical standpoint and that has
no empirical data to support it.
Nondirection has been an important part of clinical theory from the very
beginning, and it is firmly entrenched in our thinking and talking about clinical
supervision. However, the lack of empirical support, coupled with recent
findings from educational researchers, should cast some doubt on the
effectiveness of nondirective supervision for novices. We owe it to our
students and our colleagues to regularly look to other fields for ideas, assess
their workability in clinical education and respond quickly and earnestly to our
own findings.

